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Abstract
Background: Diagnostic reasoning is a key competence of physicians. We explored the effects of
knowledge, practice and additional clinical information on strategy, redundancy and accuracy of
diagnosing a peripheral neurological defect in the hand based on sensory examination.
Method: Using an interactive computer simulation that includes 21 unique cases with seven
sensory loss patterns and either concordant, neutral or discordant textual information, 21 3rd year
medical students, 21 6th year and 21 senior neurology residents each examined 15 cases over the
course of one session. An additional 23 psychology students examined 24 cases over two sessions,
12 cases per session. Subjects also took a seven-item MCQ exam of seven classical patterns
presented visually.
Results: Knowledge of sensory patterns and diagnostic accuracy are highly correlated within
groups (R2 = 0.64). The total amount of information gathered for incorrect diagnoses is no lower
than that for correct diagnoses. Residents require significantly fewer tests than either psychology
or 6th year students, who in turn require fewer than the 3rd year students (p < 0.001). The
diagnostic accuracy of subjects is affected both by level of training (p < 0.001) and concordance of
clinical information (p < 0.001). For discordant cases, refutation testing occurs significantly in 6th
year students (p < 0.001) and residents (p < 0.01), but not in psychology or 3rd year students.
Conversely, there is a stable 55% excess of confirmatory testing, independent of training or
concordance.
Conclusions: Knowledge and practice are both important for diagnostic success. For complex
diagnostic situations reasoning components employing redundancy seem more essential than those
using strategy.
Background
A major part of the undergraduate medical curriculum is
dedicated to teaching the art and science of diagnosing ill-
ness and disease. Furthermore, when assessing the clinical
competence of medical students, examiners must infer
knowledge and reasoning skills from the behavior and the
responses of the candidates.
It stands to reason then that medical teachers should pos-
sess a thorough understanding of diagnostic reasoning as
a "basic science" of medical education. In reality, howev-
er, our comprehension of the diagnostic reasoning proc-
ess is hazy at best.
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The present study attempts to explore diagnostic reason-
ing by analyzing detailed recorded data-gathering behav-
ior of experimental subjects with different levels of
expertise in a computer simulation of patients with neu-
rological lesions of the peripheral nervous supply to the
hand.
Serious reasoning research started in psychology [1] dur-
ing the 1950s. It has taken another 20 years for diagnostic
reasoning to become an area of empirical research in med-
icine [2,3]. At a time when pragmatic medical educators
believed in the existence of generic problem-solving skills,
diagnostic reasoning research reestablished the primacy of
content specific knowledge [4].
Initially research evolved along two intertwined threads,
which alternatively supported and confused each other:
the reasoning by (medical) experts and the reasoning by
computers. By now, these two fields of research have
largely gone their separate ways.
Three factors (Table 1.) have determined the type of exper-
imental studies of diagnostic reasoning: Firstly the sub-
jects studied, secondly the clinical information provided
to subjects both by content and method, and thirdly the
products of reasoning subjected to analysis.
This type of research is very labor intensive and, conse-
quently, expensive. Thus it is difficult to collect sufficient
data to reach adequate statistical power based on diagnos-
tic success and process items alone. As a consequence, di-
agnostic reasoning research leans heavily on recall,
introspection and reflection data [17]. It comes, therefore,
as no surprise that the theories derived from this research
tend towards models of semantic, analytical reasoning
[18,19]. The literature is replete with a panoply of cogni-
tive structures [20] – mainly semantic in nature – that are
supposed to underlie diagnostic reasoning. The situation
may be obscured further by the effect of social desirability
bias, which may restrain experimental subjects from ad-
mitting to employing less than superlative reasoning
strategies.
There is ample evidence [21,22] that analytical, semantic
models alone do not fully explain diagnostic reasoning.
Research based primarily on semantic recall, introspec-
tion and reflection contains blind spots, when it comes to
unconscious and implicit reasoning processes that are not
based on semantic information. Methods focusing on
such processes are thus required to look beyond semantic
networks.
For further discussion, we define inference or inferential
reasoning as: logical, algorithmic, mainly semantic, se-
quential, propositional, forward and/or backward direct-
ed, purposeful, open to reflection and introspection. In
contrast, pattern recognition is: holographic, heuristic,
mainly perceptual, parallel, redundant, unconscious,
probabilistic and intuitive. Inferential reasoning is charac-
terized by strategy, pattern recognition by redundancy.
By "strategy" we mean a purposeful sequence of tests,
where the specifics of the next test are selected on the basis
of previous tests such as to return maximum new informa-
tion. "Redundancy" on the other hand expresses the
number of tests that fail to provide any new information
for inference.
A suitable experimental model should, therefore, involve
a sufficient number of perceptual cues to allow for good
statistical power. One such candidate is eye-movement
scanning in the interpretation of histological slides or x-
rays. Unfortunately, the fact that the ocular axis is directed
at a certain location on the image does not indicate, what
is actually seen by the central visual field or that visual in-
formation is indeed being recorded and processed.
We have selected a simple deterministic computer simula-
tion involving the (sensory) neurological examination of
the peripheral nervous system in the hand. The collected
sequence of responses and coordinates of each sensory
stimulus allow statistical inference on the reasoning strat-
egies, be they inferential or based on pattern recognition.
For this experiment we asked ourselves 5 questions:
1. How do subjects pick the specific locations on the hand
to be tested (strategy)?
Table 1: Factors in empirical research on diagnostic reasoning.
Subjects studied Experts [5], outstanding physicians [2], physicians-at-risk [6], "typical physicians" [7], learners [10] 
with differing levels of expertise.
Clinical information provided Sequential text fragments [8], x-rays [9,5], pictures [10] (e.g. dermatology [11], pathology), stand-
ardized patients [2], other simulations [12].
Products of reasoning analyzed Diagnostic success [13], items collected [4,14], recall [15,16], reflection, "thinking aloud", introspec-
tion [5]BMC Medical Education 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/3/1
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2. How many additional points in excess of what is re-
quired for strict inference, do they test before reaching a
diagnosis (redundancy)?
3. How often is the selected diagnosis correct (accuracy)?
4. How are strategy, redundancy and accuracy related to
knowledge and practice?
5. How are strategy, redundancy and accuracy affected, if
subjects receive additional clinical information (symp-
toms and history) that is concordant, neutral or discord-
ant with respect to the sensory pattern?
The key to answering these questions is the ability to
quantify the information revealed by each successive sen-
sory test. The accepted measure of information content is
entropy, as introduced by Claude Shannon [23] in 1948
(Appendix A, see Additional file 1). Specifically, it indi-
cates the potentially available information not yet re-
vealed by the test sequence. An entropy value of 1.0
indicates that none of the available diagnostic informa-
tion has yet been revealed and that all diagnostic possibil-
ities are still equally likely. Conversely, an entropy value
of 0.0 indicates that all relevant diagnostic information
has been revealed and that only one diagnosis remains
possible.
Figure 1
MCQ score and diagnostic accuracy fort the experimental groups. The values for psychology students in their initial session 
and in the second session, one week later, are plotted separately.
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Entropy does not attempt to estimate or model the current
state of a typical diagnostician's knowledge regarding the
case. It indicates simply, how much information has been
revealed to an ideal inference engine. This allows us to
demonstrate the gap that exists between the information
content revealed and the information actually used by the
diagnostician.
If an individual sensory test ("pin prick") does not change
entropy, the test adds no new information – it is redun-
dant. Thus redundancy is defined as the total number of
sensory tests in a sequence that did not alter entropy.
The faster a subject accumulates sufficient information to
arrive at the correct diagnosis, the more efficient is his di-
agnostic strategy. Quantitatively, this is indicated by a
smaller area under the entropy/number-of-test curve (Fig-
ure 6).
A subject's strategy can be strictly inferential (i.e. no re-
dundant tests), in which case it is automatically optimal,
subjects could systematically attempt to refute the appar-
ently likeliest hypothesis (Popperian strategy) or, as hap-
pens often in reality, they may try to confirm those
abnormal findings that support their currently favorite
hypothesis.
To determine, which information gathering strategy was
used, three measures were calculated: (i) how quickly rel-
evant information was collected as expressed by the area
under Shannon's entropy as a function of the number of
tests; (ii) the specific number of refutations of discordant
cues (Refutation matrix, Appendix B, see Additional file
2); and (iii) the excess of confirmatory testing (Confirma-
tion matrix, Appendix C, see Additional file 3).
Methods
Seven familiar neurological patterns of sensory loss in the
hand were simulated: C6, C7 and C8 nerve root injury, ra-
dial, median and ulnar nerve lesion and poly-neuropathy.
Photographs of the dorsal and volar aspects of either the
left or right hand were displayed on the screen. With
mouse clicks subjects could "test" individual points on
the hand. Depending on the location tested and the un-
derlying predetermined diagnosis, one of three verbal re-
sponses was returned deterministically in a small pop-up
window at the point tested:
• "it feels normal",
• "it feels different", or
• "I can hardly feel it".
The simulation ran as a Java applet within a regular Web
page. Subjects were not provided with feedback regarding
individual diagnoses during the actual experiment; they
did, however, receive detailed feedback after they had
completed all the cases.
Each pattern was presented in the context of additional
clinical information (symptoms, history and a functional
photograph of the hand) concordant, neutral or discord-
ant relative to the sensory pattern. The additional clinical
information was relatively bland, providing only subtle
suggestions as to the actual diagnosis whether concordant
or discordant, although the concordant information was
more specific. The neutral items contained no clues. For
example, the discordant cases of radial and median nerve
deficits had a history vaguely suggestive of a mild cervical
injury. Sensory patterns and additional clinical informa-
tion were repeatedly checked by experienced neurologists
for realism.
The experimental subjects consisted of a convenience
sample of 23 psychology students, 21 3rd year medical
students, 21 6th year medical students (Switzerland has a
six year medical curriculum; during the first two years stu-
dents concentrate on basic sciences) and 21 senior
neurology residents. The junior medical students had
studied neuroanatomy, but were unfamiliar with the de-
tailed sensory patterns and clinical pictures. They had nev-
er practiced sensory examination. Senior medical students
had studied sensory patterns, had limited knowledge of
Table 2: Diagnostic Accuracy – Results of ANOVA: Tests of between sequence effects
Source df F Sig.
CONCORD 2 17.392 .000
LEVEL 3 12.720 .000
CONCORD * LEVEL 6 2.877 .009
Error 1454
Total 1466
Corrected Total 1465BMC Medical Education 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/3/1
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clinical pictures and had been introduced to sensory test-
ing. Neurology residents acted as substitute experts, since
we were not able to recruit sufficient certified neurolo-
gists. The psychology students served as a control group
with roughly matching intelligence but no medical educa-
tion. Psychology students knew neither neuroanatomy
nor clinical pictures. Neither had they been taught sensory
examination. They were exposed to visually presented
maps of the sensory patterns as part of the experimental
protocol.
Psychology students participated in two sessions one
week apart, the rest in one session each. In their first ses-
sion psychology students were shown the seven patterns
as visual maps together with diagnostic labels during 15
minutes. Otherwise all sessions followed the same se-
quence: (i) an MCQ test of the seven patterns presented
visually as sensory maps; (ii) a single practice case that
was not recorded; (iii) a series of 12 cases each for the psy-
chology students and 15 cases each for the rest in a bal-
anced block design. As result of an oversight, the blocks
were not perfectly balanced across the 21 possible
combinations (6 × 7 / 2). There were only seven unique
blocks each with three different sequences of cases. Alto-
gether, all 21 cases occurred with equal frequency for each
group. We do not, therefore, believe that this error intro-
duced any significant bias.
Figure 2
Estimated marginal means of diagnostic accuracy as function of the level of training and the degree of concordance.
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After each test subjects had the option of picking a diagno-
sis from a menu and proceeding to the next case. As part
of a further study to be reported separately, the test se-
quence was interrupted automatically at 5, 10, 20 and 40
tests. Subjects were then asked to indicate their current
best estimates for the likelihood of each diagnostic
hypothesis.
Test coordinates and time since the previous test were
stored test by test for the whole case sequence in the client
side Java applet and sent to the Web server as part of the
active server page request, upon the selection of a specific
diagnosis. Data were automatically stored in a relational
database (Microsoft Access) keyed to case and subject. Af-
ter completion of the experimental phase of the study,
data were preprocessed by means of a Microsoft Visual Ba-
sic program to determine the expected findings at each
point tested for the actual diagnosis as well as for the al-
ternative hypotheses. These results were again stored in a
relational table. Based on these findings, plausibility, en-
tropy, redundancy, refutation- and confirmation-counts
were calculated with a second MS-VB program (Method
described in Appendix A, B & C, see additional files 1, 2
Figure 3
Results of unpaired T-tests of residual entropy for correct and incorrect diagnoses.
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and 3). SPSS was used for the statistical analysis of these
derived dependent variables.
For each subject the knowledge of sensory patterns was
calculated as the ratio of correctly identified patterns over
seven, the total number of patterns in the multiple choice
exam. Diagnostic accuracy was calculated for each subject
as the ratio of correct diagnoses over total cases processed.
Psychology students participated in two sessions with 12
cases each thus diagnosing a total of 24 cases. Since only
21 unique cases existed, each of these subjects encoun-
tered three of 21 cases twice. Using a random number gen-
erator, either the first or second of these double cases was
dropped from further analysis.
Results
A total of 1,428 sequences with 27,524 test points were
analyzed. In 17 sequences subjects guessed the diagnosis
without performing any tests. Residents guessed 12 con-
cordant cases correctly. Students guessed three of the re-
maining five sequences incorrectly. The two correct
guesses were in concordant cases, one by a 3rd and one by
a 6th year student.
Group means of MCQ scores and diagnostic accuracy cor-
relate well (Fig. 1). For psychology students the mean val-
ues for the initial and follow-up session one week later
were calculated separately. Diagnostic accuracy of resi-
dents is higher than one would expect from the knowl-
edge of patterns alone.
The diagnostic accuracy of the diagnosis is examined by
ANOVA (Table 2). Diagnostic accuracy is affected
significantly both by the level of training and the degree
of concordance.
The diagnostic accuracy of psychology students is not af-
fected by the degree of concordance, while the accuracy of
the residents is significantly eroded by discordant infor-
mation (Fig. 2).
Discordant cases form a homogeneous subset against neu-
tral and concordant cases at α = 0.05. The level of training
does not separate into homogeneous subsets.
For all four groups of experimental subjects the residual
entropy does not differ significantly for cases diagnosed
correctly and incorrectly (Fig. 3). The 6th year students, in
fact, show borderline increased entropy (lower certainty)
for correct diagnoses. Diagnostic errors, therefore, do not
appear to be due to insufficient information gathering but
rather to flawed reasoning.
Area under the entropy curve and redundancy were exam-
ined by MANOVA (Table 3).
Both level of training and degree of concordance have a
significant effect on redundancy. But the area under the
entropy curve depends only on the level of training, not
the degree of concordance. Post hoc analysis (Scheffé test)
shows the area under the entropy curve to split up into
two homogeneous subsets: 3rd year medical students ver-
sus the rest. Redundancy splits into three homogeneous
subsets: 3rd year students, residents, and 6th year medical
together with psychology students as a middle group.
In regards to degree of concordance, redundancy splits
into two homogeneous subsets: concordant versus neutral
and discordant.
The redundancy of psychology students is not affected by
the additional clinical information – they do not recog-
Table 3: Results of MANOVA: Tests of Between-Sequence Effects
Source Dependent Variable df F Sig.
Model Redundancy 12 207.878 .000
Area 12 160.755 .000
LEVEL Redundancy 3 46.174 .000
Area 3 16.524 .000
CONCORD Redundancy 2 15.078 .000
Area 2 .539 .583
LEVEL * CONCORD Redundancy 6 2.216 .039
Area 6 .974 .441
Error Redundancy 1416
Area 1416
Total Redundancy 1428
Area 1428BMC Medical Education 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/3/1
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nize its implication (Fig. 4). For the residents, on the other
hand, it affects redundancy by almost a factor of three.
For the area under the entropy curve (strategy), the effect
of either the level of training or the degree of concordance
is less clear cut (Fig. 5).
It is obvious, though, that 3rd year medical students show
least evidence of strategy, independent of additional clin-
ical information.
To test whether subjects specifically attempt to refute the
diagnostic hypotheses suggested by the additional clinical
information in the discordant cases, we employ
Popperian analysis (Table 4) as described in Appendix B
(see Additional file 2).
Psychology and 3rd year medical students are not affected
by the additional discordant clinical data. They don't
know enough about the clinical syndromes.
Figure 4
Estimated marginal means of redundancy as function of level of training and degree of concordance.
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Figure 5
Estimated marginal means of area under the entropy curve as function of the level of training and the degree of concordance.
Table 4: Contingency table analysis of Popperian refutation counts.
Psychol. 3. Year 6. Year Residents
Chi-Square 1.225 0.263 20.282 7.385
p-Value n.s. n.s. < 0.001 < 0.01
Common Odds Ratio 1.030 0.985 1.168 1.111
Redundancy Ratio 1.012 1.129 1.059 1.266
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Residents and 6th year students show a significant though
small attempt at refuting the clinically suggested diag-
noses. The excess of specific refutations is about 11% for
residents and 17% for 6th year students respectively
(Common Odds Ratio).
There is a significant difference in the increase of redun-
dancy between residents and 6th year students: χ2  =
17.24; p < 0.001; C.O.R. = 1.24. In other words, in the
presence of discordant information 6th year students
seem to use more strategy while residents rely more on re-
dundancy. This could be explained by the "intermediacy
effect".
Finally, we looked for evidence of confirmatory testing
(Appendix C see Additional file 3). In fact, confirmatory
testing seems to be a stable feature, independent of level
of training or degree of concordance (Table 5).
The tendency to selectively confirm expected hypotheses
rather than testing randomly or refute alternative
hypotheses appears inherent in this diagnostic reasoning
experiment.
Discussion and Conclusions
Diagnostic accuracy, strategy and redundancy depend pri-
marily on the knowledge of sensory patterns and associat-
ed syndromes. The effect of knowledge on accuracy and
redundancy appears to be stronger than on strategy. In
fact, effective data-gathering strategies seem to play a mi-
nor role. Even where appropriate, little refutation of alter-
native hypotheses occurs. Just the opposite: confirmatory
testing seems to be dominant.
In addition, both accuracy and redundancy, but not strat-
egy appear to depend on practice independently from
knowledge.
These results appear somewhat counterintuitive. Experts
should have vastly better problem-solving strategies than
novices. True, in the real world, experts also have an edge
on knowledge. The knowledge spread in our experiment
was insufficient to demonstrate that aspect.
There might be another explanation, however. In our ex-
periment, to reach a diagnosis by inference requires not
only the seven diagnostic hypotheses to be present in
short-term memory, but also the roughly seven tests in
strategically placed locations and their combinations
must be available at all times. In other words, for purely
inferential diagnostic reasoning one needs to operate on
approximately 49 items or 5.6 bits of information. As
George A. Miller [28] has shown the capacity of short term
memory is only about seven items or 2.8 bits of informa-
tion. The scope of short-term memory, therefore, would
appear insufficient to support pure inference. Short of
using memory substitutes, such as paper and pencil, the
only alternative is to resort to what Miller refers to as "re-
coding" – an implicit reasoning strategy. This is a hypoth-
esis that requires further testing.
It remains surprising, however, that the psychology stu-
dents were able to set up an efficient recoding scheme af-
ter only 15 minutes' training that allows easy shifting
from overt to latent pattern recognition.
The reported findings may also have implications for
teaching and assessment. If the rate limiting factor for in-
ference is the number of items that have to be kept in
short term memory, teachers can assist learners by con-
structing diagnostic trees that involve only two or three
branches at each decision point, rather than long lists of
differential diagnoses. Such cognitive structures
correspond to Bordage's [29] key features or Mandin's
schemes [30].
In the assessment of diagnostic reasoning, redundancy of
requested information appears as a second independent,
sensitive measure of competence besides the accuracy of
the diagnosis.
Table 5: Chi-square, significance and estimated ratio of actual over expected confirmatory tests.
Ratio actual/expected χ2
p-Value
All 1.57 2084.3 <0.001
Psychol. 1.65 873.5 <0.001
3. year 1.52 549.0 <0.001
6. year 1.51 368.1 <0.001
Resid. 1.55 313.1 <0.001
Concord 1.61 690.0 <0.001
Neutral 1.54 648.0 <0.001
Discord 1.56 756.3 <0.001BMC Medical Education 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/3/1
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Figure 6
Example of one illustrative sequence. For all diagnoses except D4 the plausibilities successively disappear. Correspondingly, the 
entropy falls from 1.0 to 0.0. After seven tests total certainty exists.
Table 6: Popperian refutation matrix for the seven discordant cases. The '+' indicates the cells favored by the discordant information, 
whereas the '-' designates non-favored cells.
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